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Many nations have expressed interest in fostering coopera-
tion in international bankruptcy.1 To facilitate this coopera-
tion, the U.S. Congress enacted section 304 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code ("Section 304") which enables
representatives of foreign bankruptcy proceedings to request
the assistance of United States courts.2 The U.S. Congress
hoped that this legislation would serve as a model for other
countries promulgating bankruptcy laws.' This Comment will
analyze how U.S. courts have applied section 304 to foreign
bankruptcy proceedings over the past decade. It will focus on
EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION OF FRANCE, (1790)
(Burke argued that the traditions, privileges, sentiments, and imaginations
of"gentlemen" (the aristocracy) created a necessary drapery in life over true
human nature and naked reason. He contended that this drapery preserved
a harmony of order, justice, and peace. Burke believed that with the French
Revolution, "[aill the drapery of life is to be rudely torn off" and only a
society of tyranny and chaos would remain.).
" J.D. 1992, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 1989,
University of Chicago. I wish to thank Professor Lynn M. LoPucki,
Professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin Law School, for his
suggestions, guidance, and criticisms.
1 See E. Bruce Leonard, Jay A. Carfagnini & Richard H. McLaren, Can
There Be International Co-Operation in Foreign Bankruptcies? A Canadian
Examination of Some Alternative Models, 3 REV. INT'L Bus. L. 23, 25 (1989).
2 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1988).
See Leonard, Carfagnini & McLaren, supra note 1, at 25, 26 (citing
Broude, Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcy Proceedings in the United States,
(International Bar Association, London, England), September 14-18, 1987,
at 14.).
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cases involving U.S. creditors in which courts have decided
whether to cede jurisdiction over U.S.-based assets to foreign
insolvency proceedings. Many commentators have said that
these cases exemplify the United States' commitment to
ensuring a unitary bankruptcy proceeding for cases involving
international concerns. This Comment will question that
assessment's validity.
Close examination of the cases reveals that most U.S.
courts will help facilitate a foreign proceeding only when the
foreign representative assures the court that such proceedings
will "substantially" mirror U.S. proceedings. Yet, observers
have widely acknowledged that "no two countries' insolvency
laws are precisely the same or share the many unique and
innovative features of the United States Code."' Thus, the
majority of the cases in which the courts have advocated
unitary bankruptcy proceedings serve only as a "drapery of
illusion"--an outward commitment to international comity that
disguises the protectionism lurking beneath. As soon as the
foreign proceedings slightly compromise the interests of United
States creditors, most United States courts quickly discard this
drapery and reveal their strong commitment to protecting
their principal concern, U.S. creditors. Although the United
States Bankruptcy Code ("Code") does not require that the
interests of U.S. creditors supersede the interests of foreign
creditors, a majority of the U.S. courts have applied Section
304 in this way.
While Congress may have intended that Section 304 would
promote a model of international comity, the flexibility that
section provided to U.S. courts has subverted the intent. In
the majority of their decisions, U.S. courts have permitted the
concept of territoriality to override that of universality. These
decisions have seriously limited section 304's potential as a
model for international bankruptcy law.
' Michael R. Hughes, An Australian Perspective on Interpool, 2 INT'L




2. TERRITORIALITY V. UNIVERSALITY
Territoriality competes with universality as the preeminent
theory of multinational bankruptcy administration. Under the
territoriality theory, the country in which the litigant has its
assets and which conducts the bankruptcy proceeding protects
the local creditors' interests in the assets and does not
recognize foreign bankruptcy adjudications.5 That country's
adjudication does not affect the debtor's property beyond its
borders because the territoriality theory "posits that bankrupt-
cy laws should not be recognized beyond a state's borders.
Thus, a debtor who has assets in more than one jurisdiction
may find itself embroiled in more than one bankruptcy
proceeding.
7
The territoriality theory's proponents say that the theory
does not inconvenience local creditors because it does not
require them to make claims in other jurisdictions. Those
favoring territoriality also argue that a local court might
protect local creditors to a greater extent than a foreign court.
In addition, the territoriality theory prevents foreign states
from giving "their own subjects particular advantages at the
expense of others, especially, but not exclusively through the
exercise of excessive jurisdiction."'
Critics, however, cite several disadvantages of the
territoriality theory. For example, if a debtor holds property
in other countries, domestic jurisdiction does not reach that
property. Hence, the debtor might dispose of or transfer
domestic jurisdiction property to foreign countries in order to
disadvantage local creditors; the local creditors have very little
power to prevent or reverse such a transfer. If creditors want
to obtain assets beyond the state's borders, they must go to the
foreign countries in which the debtor holds property and try to
r See Overseas Inns S.A.P.A. v. United States, 685 F. Supp. 968, 971
(N.D. Texas, 1988); see also Ulrich Huber, Creditor Equality in Transnation-
al Bankruptcies: The United States Position, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
741, 745 (1986).
' Richard A. Gitlin & Evan D. Flaschen, The International Void in the
Law of Multinational Bankruptcies, 42 Bus. LAW. 307, 309 (1987).
" Barbara K. Unger, United States Recognition of Foreign Bankruptcies,
19 INT'L L. 1153, 1155 (1985).
" J. H. Dalhuisen, International Insolvency and Bankruptcy (MB)
§1.01[1 (1986).
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attach the property. Also, the potential number of contempo-
raneous proceedings risks inconsistent results for the same
debtor Furthermore, a territorial approach appears "incon-
sistent with the general trend towards facilitating internation-
al and cross-border transactions." 0
The universality theory states that all jurisdictions should
recognize the most appropriate jurisdictions bankruptcy laws.
This unitary approach means that a debtor who has multina-
tional creditors and assets will resolve all of its financial
difficulties in one central forum." Throughout the last
decade, commentators and jurists have debated how to make
this difficult choice of forum."2 To resolve all of the debtor's
financial difficulties in one forum, the trustee of the bankrupt-
cy proceeding would marshall all of the debtor's assets and
subject them to the central forum's jurisdiction. All other
jurisdictions would act ancillary to and in aid of the bankrupt-
cy proceeding in the central forum.'" Additionally, the
trustee would require all the debtor's creditors, no matter
what country they resided, to go to the central forum and
prove their claims. Thus, for the universality theory to work,
all other jurisdictions must recognize and enforce the original
forum's adjudication.' 4
According to the universality theory, all the assets and
creditors should be subject to the jurisdiction of one tribunal
which would facilitate equitable distribution of the estate. 5
"Ideally, all creditors are supposed to share equally in the
See id.
10 Sarah K. Harding, Re Sefel Geophysical Ltd.: A Canadian Approach
to Some Specific Problems in the Adjudication of International Insolvencies,
12 DALHOUSIE L. J. 412, 439 (1989).
" See Jay L. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism In Global Insolvencies:
Choice Of Law And Choice Of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 461 (1991).
1" See Article 15(2) Draft of the United States of America-Canada
Bankruptcy Treaty (1979) (indicating that the countries choose an asset-
based test to determine jurisdiction). See also EUR. CONVEN. ON CERTAIN
INT'L ASPECTS OF BANKR., Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act
(July 1990) (indicating that this convention based its jurisdictional
determinations on where the debtor has "the centre of his main interests.").
13 See Westbrook, supra note 11.
14 See Unger, supra note 7, at 1154.




assets of a debtor's estate." ' The universality approach
achieves this goal more efficiently and simply than the
territoriality approach because it obviates multiple adjudica-
tions in different jurisdictions. The universality theory would
also eliminate any forum shopping problems which might
otherwise plague the territoriality approach. 7
The detractors of the universality theory, however, point
out that the universality theory inconveniences creditors who
would have to go to a foreign jurisdiction to assert their
claims. In addition, the foreign proceeding might apply
different laws than those in the creditor's jurisdiction, which
may have enhanced the creditor's rights." Ostensibly, these
foreign laws would give the creditors who live in the foreign
jurisdiction particular advantages over other creditors of the
debtor. 9 Universality depends on local cooperation from
each territory for enforcement because it has no force of its
own. Unfortunately problems achieving this cooperation
continue to limit universality's effectiveness. 0
3. THE UNITED STATES TREATMENT OF FOREIGN
BANKRUPTCIES BEFORE THE ENACTMENT OF SECTION 304
Historically, the United States has taken a very territorial
approach in recognizing and applying foreign bankruptcy
judgments to domestic property.21 The United States' bias
in favor of U.S. creditors has led other nations to deem it the
least cooperative of the major trading states.2" In In re Toga
,' Kurt H. Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law:
Lessons Taught By Herstatt and Company, 52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1977).
7 See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum
Shopping in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held
Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11, 58 (1991).
13 See Unger, supra note 7, at 1155.
19 Dalhuisen, supra note 8, at 3-9.
20 Id. at §2.03[4]. But see EUR. CONVEN. ON CERTAIN INTL ASPECTS OF
BANKR., supra note 12.
21 See Overseas Inns S.A.P.A. v. United States, 685 F. Supp. at 971
(citing Harrison v. Sterry, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 289, 302 (1809) and Ogden v.
Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213, 360 (1827)); see also Unger, supra note
7, at 1155.
2 See Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 6, at 314; Stacey A. Morales &
Barbara A. Deutsch, Bankruptcy Code Section 304 and U.S. Recognition of
Foreign Bankruptcies: The Tyranny of Comity, 39 BUS. LAW. 1573, 1577
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Mfg.,2" the bankruptcy' court found that "[h]istorically the
bankruptcy laws of our country have been hostile towards
claims asserted by foreign trustees in bankruptcy against
alleged estate property located in the United States."24
3.1. The Doctrine of Comity
Prior to enacting Section 304, the U.S. Congress had not
provided official rules which U.S. courts could apply to resolve
international jurisdictional bankruptcy conflicts. Absent such
rules, the courts applied the vague doctrine of comity." The
Supreme Court defined comity in the 1895 case, Hilton v.
Guyot: 8
"Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of
absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere
courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory
to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another
nation, having due regard both to international duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or
of other persons who are under the protection of its
law.27
Other U.S. courts have adopted the definition.2" The U.S.
courts had no obligations to recognize foreign laws, judgments
or proceedings; recognition depended on the circumstances of
each case.2" With few exceptions, 0 courts initially used
comity as a shield to protect the interests of United States creditors'
(1984).
23 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
24 Id. at 167.
" See Huber, supra note 5, at 757. See generally Harding, supra note
10, at 425, 426 (discussing the origin of comity).
26 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
27 Id. at 163-64.
28 Harding, supra note 10.
29 See Unger, supra note 7, at 1159.
So See Huber, supra note 5, at 757, 758 (citing Canada Southern Ry. v.
Gebhard, 109 U.S. 427 (1883)).
"' See Huber, supra note 5, at 757, 758 (citing Disconto Gesellschaft v.





3.2. United States Cases Which Have Applied the International
Notion of Comity
Prior to the enactment of section 304, U.S. courts had
occasionally strayed from taking a purely territorial approach.
For example, the Supreme Court's 1883 decision, Canada
Southern Ry. v. Gebhard,2 reflected universalist thought. In
that case, New York plaintiffs had brought an action in federal
courts in New York to recover on the bonds of a failing
Canadian railway corporation."3 The Parliament of the
Dominion of Canada had authorized the railway company to
reorganize on the condition that a majority of the outstanding
bondholders vote for the reorganization."' Under the reorga-
nization plan, the railway substituted new securities for the
old ones that the bondholders had held. 5  The Supreme
Court held that the reorganization bound the United States
holders who did not vote with the majority as long as the
United States bondholders had the same right to participate
in the railway reorganization as the Canadian bondholders
had.3" The Court stated that:
Unless all parties in interest, wherever they reside, can
be bound by the arrangement which it is sought to have
legalized the scheme may fail. All home creditors can
be bound. What is needed is to bind those who are
abroad. Under these circumstances the true spirit of
international comity requires that schemes of this
character, legalized at home, should be recognized in
other countries.3 '
The Court recognized that a territorial approach could destroy
the railway's reorganization plan. Therefore, the Court found
that it should privilege creditor equality over protecting
domestic creditors.38
Two other cases involving Canadian bankruptcy proceed-
2 Canada Southern Ry., 109 U.S. at 427.
33 See id. at 531.
14 See id. at 530.
8 See id.
8 See id. at 539.
3 Id.
8 See Huber, supra note 5, at 758.
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ings have applied universality principles. The court in the
first case, Clarkson v. Shaheen,"9 allowed a Canadian trustee
in bankruptcy to obtain records from a bankrupt company's
New York office.4" The court held that "[t]hese exceptions [to
the rule of comity] are construed especially narrowly when the
alien jurisdiction is, like Canada, a sister common law
jurisdiction with procedures akin to our own."' 1
It has been suggested that this case, and several others
decided in the decade before enactment of section 304,
represented a shift away from.., the absolute protec-
tion of domestic creditors' interests, and toward creditor
equality as the primary goal to be achieved in the
distribution of assets in transnational bankruptcies.42
In the second case, Cornfeld v. Investors Overseas Serv.,4"
the court found it appropriate to defer to the Canadian
liquidation proceeding as a matter of international comity even
though the company had some of its assets in New York."
That court granted comity because similar policies underlie the
United States and Canadian bankruptcy laws. The court
stressed that the Canadian proceedings would adequately
protect the creditor.45
4. CONGRESS' ENACTMENT OF SECTION 304
In the pre-Section 304 era, a bankrupt's foreign represen-
tative could only acquire the bankrupt's U.S.-based assets
through litigation in state or federal nonbankruptcy courts or
through a full bankruptcy proceeding in the United States.46
39 544 F.2d 624 (2d Cir. 1976).
40 See id. at 632.
41 See id. at 629-30.
" Leonard, Carfagnini & McLaren, supra note 1, at 28 (citation omitted).
4 471 F. Supp. 1255 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
44 See id.
"' See Huber, supra note 5, at 429.
4' Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 6, at 316; see also 2 WILLIAM M.
COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1 304.01, at 304-4 (15th ed. 1985) (Other
Code provisions pertain to foreign bankruptcy representatives. For
example, Section 303(b)(4) mandates that a foreign representative who files
a petition for an involuntary case may commence a full bankruptcy case
with the bankruptcy court. Furthermore, Section 305 "authorizes a foreign




A petition requesting a full bankruptcy proceeding creates an
estate, triggers the automatic stay, makes available avoidance
provisions," and submits the petitioner to the full jurisdic-
tion of any court in the United States for any other purpose.4 8
A foreign representative requesting full U.S. bankruptcy
proceedings would also have to consider that such proceedings
generate exorbitant costs and greater delays for creditors.49
Congress enacted Section 304 as part of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978.50 Congress intended to create a provi-
sion which could help solve the complex and increasingly
important problems of what legal effect the U.S. courts should
give to foreign bankruptcy proceedings."M Section 304 pro-
vides:
(a) A case ancillary to a foreign proceeding is commenced by
filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under this
section by a foreign representative.
(b) Subject to the provisions of subsection (c) of this section, if
a party in interest does not timely controvert the petition, or
after trial the court may-
(1) enjoin the commencement or continuation of-
(A) any action against-
under the Code if a foreign insolvency proceedings is pending and the
factors specified in section 304(c) so warrant.").
41 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 46, at 304-3.
48 11 U.S.C. § 306 (1988).
" See Leonard, Carfagnini & McLaren, supra note 1, at 28; In re Axona
Int'l Credit & Commerce, 88 B.R. 597, 607 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
60 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
r" S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5821; H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 324-25
(1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6281, cited in Cunard S.S. v.
Salen Reefer Serv., 773 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 1985). See generally Gitlin
& Flaschen, supra note 6, at 314, 315. Congress enacted section 304 to
address the United States' inability to handle creditors who filed involun-
tary bankruptcy petitions in the United States as a result of the 1974 failure
of Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt Kommanditgesellschaft auf Aktien ( E-erstatt"),
a major West German commercial bank. In response to the then underde-
veloped status of the United States law respecting foreign insolvency
proceedings, the creditors dismissed their petition and instead reached an
out of court settlement. The Herstatt affair "dramatically increased
awareness in the United States of the problems of multinational bankrupt-
cies and eventually led to a formal shift in policy in favor of greater
recognition of foreign bankruptcies." Id. at 314; Unger, supra note 7, at
1163-65; Nadelmann, supra note 16.
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(i) a debtor with respect to property in
such foreign proceeding; or
(ii) such property; or
(B) the enforcement of any judgment against the
debtor with respect to such property, or any act or
the commencement or continuation of any judicial
proceeding to create or enforce a lien against the
property of such estate;
(2) order turnover of the property of such estate, or the
proceeds of such property, to such foreign representative;
or
(3) order other appropriate relief.
(c) In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b)
of this section, the court shall be guided by what will best
assure an economical and expeditious administration of such
estate, consistent with-
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or
interests in such estate;
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States
against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing
of claims in such foreign proceeding;
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions
of property of such estate;
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially
in accordance with the order prescribed by this title;
(5) comity; and
(6) if appropriate, the provisions of an opportunity for
a fresh start for the individual that such foreign
proceeding concerns.52
Section 304 presents the foreign representative with a
choice of commencing a full bankruptcy case in the United
States or of "filing a limited petition in order to administer
assets of the foreign estate located in the United States and to
prevent dismemberment of those assets by local creditors.""
52 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1988).
"' Leonard, Carfagnini & McLaren, supra note 1, at 28. Because Section
304 does not commence a full bankruptcy proceeding, the petition does not
create an estate, trigger an automatic stay, make available the Code's
avoidance provisions, or culminate in a discharge. COLLIER ON BANKRUPT-




Therefore, the court does not submit the foreign representative
to U.S. jurisdiction for any other purpose, except "to adminis-
ter assets located in this country, to prevent dismemberment
by local creditors of assets located here, or for other appropri-
ate relief."54
4.1. The Legislative Intent Behind Section 304
Section 304's history reflects a legislative intent to give
courts flexibility in applying Section 304(c).55 Section 304(c)
states that assurance of "an economical and expeditious
administration" of the bankrupt's estate should guide the court
in determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of
the section.56 Section 304(c) enumerates six factors to direct
the court in tailoring its decision concerning whether to grant
relief. The legislature has described subsection (c)'s purpose
as follows:
These guidelines are designed to give the court the
maximum flexibility in handling ancillary cases.
Principles of international comity and respect for the
judgments and laws of other nations suggest that the
court be permitted to make the appropriate orders
under all of the circumstances of each case, rather than
being provided with inflexible rules. 7
The legislature explicitly intended the six Section 304(c)
factors to act as six guidelines which a court should weigh and
consider to maximize the court's latitude in ruling on a foreign
representative's petition. In general, U.S. courts have failed
to view these six factors as guidelines. Instead, they have
treated each factor as a separate test that petitioners must
meet as a prerequisite to a judicial grant of Section 304 relief.
Courts have granted relief only when a foreign proceeding has
to the United States courts for any other purpose. 11 U.S.C. § 306 (1978).
54 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 46, at 304-3.
5" In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 627, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Gitlin &
Flaschen, supra note 6, at 316, 317.
5, 11 U.S.C. § 304(b)-(c) (1988).
57 H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. 324-325 (1977), S. REP. No.
95-989, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. 35 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5821 (emphasis added).
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passed all six tests.5"
4.2. In General-Judicial Application of Section 304(c)
The courts' categorization of subsection (c)'s six factors as
prerequisites to granting relief breeds an inherent tension
between affording domestic creditors maximum protection and
favoring the main proceeding in a foreign country to further
creditor equality. Requirements of 'just treatment of all
holders of claims," "prevention of preferential or fraudulent
dispositions," 0 and "comity,"1 which favor the universality
theory may directly conflict with "distribution of proceeds...
substantially in accordance with the order prescribed by this
title"62 and "the provision of an opportunity for a fresh
start"" which favor the territoriality approach." Even
though one court has stated that "[t]he central examination
which [the court] must undertake in order to comply with
Section 304(c) is whether the relief petitioners seek will afford
equality of distribution of the available assets."65 In fact,
most courts have used Section 304(c)(4) as a threshold test
which petitioners must meet before the court will continue to
examine Section 304(c)'s other factors. As a result, commenta-
tors have described Section 304(c)(4) as a "device to protect the
interests of United States claimholders [and as] a major
obstacle to the foreign representative." '
Some consider Section 304 an implied recognition of the
universality concept.67 Others argue that "Section 304 thus
represents a cautious step towards adoption of the universality
58 Huber, supra note 5, at 748.
11 U.S.C. § 304(c)(1) (1988).
6 Id. § 304(c)(3).
61 Id § 304(c)(5).
12 Id. § 304(c)(4).
" I& § 304(c)(6).
64 "Congress declined to resolve these conflicts," but instead wanted to
allow the courts to consider all the factors according to the facts of each case
thus giving the courts maximum flexibility. COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra
note 46, J 304.04 at 304-10; see also Harding, supra note 10, at 431; and
Westbrook, supra note 11.
65 In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 628 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
-66 Huber, supra note 5, at 754; see also Leonard, Carfagnini and
McLaren, supra note 1.




theory of multinational bankruptcy administration." 8 This
Comment will explore the major cases which have interpreted
Section 304. It will argue that while the majority of U.S.
courts claim to employ universality in dealing with foreign
bankruptcy proceedings, the majority of cases reveal that the
courts only apply universality when they have assurance that
foreign law will treat U.S. creditors virtually the same way
that filing in the United States would have. In general, the
courts revert back to their historical territoriality approach
when the foreign bankruptcy proceedings would treat the U.S.
creditors and the U.S.-based assets even slightly differently
than a U.S. proceeding would treat them.
5. THE JUDICIAL APPLICATION OF SECTION 304
To properly understand how the courts have applied
Section 304 to foreign bankruptcy proceedings, one must
closely analyze the relevant cases and, more specifically, the
facts of each case and how these facts affected the court's
decision. The facts have particular importance because "the
United States has not formally adopted either the universality
or territoriality theory to the exclusion of the other, but has
adopted principles of both. The determination of which theory
to apply in any given case largely depends on the circumstanc-
es of each situation."'
Three lines of cases have developed since Congress enacted
Section 304. The first line of cases has deferred to the foreign
proceedings in favor of a unitary approach. 0 The second line
of cases has deferred to the foreign proceeding, but only after
laying down specific conditions that such proceedings must
satisfy. These conditions usually contain a promise to apply
68 Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki, Section 304 Of The
United States Bankruptcy Code: Cases Ancillary To Foreign Proceedings at
5. (Paper presented to the ABA Annual Meeting in Toronto, Ontario,
Canada, on Aug. 8, 1988) (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Section
3041.
*o Unger, supra note 7, at 1155.
In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 627 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Cunard S.S.
v. Salen Reefer Ser., 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985); 49 B.R. 614 (S.D.N.Y.
1985); In re Lines, 81 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988); Angulo v. Kedzep,
29 B.R. 417 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1983); In re Gee, 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1985).
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some aspect of U.S. law to the distribution.1 The third line
of cases, however, has refused to defer to foreign proceedings
because those courts found that U.S. creditors would receive
unfair treatment in the foreign proceedings or that, for public
policy reasons, a U.S. court should adjudicate their claims.'2
The specific details of the first and second line of cases
manifest that in most cases the courts only defer to foreign
proceedings when they receive assurances. These assurances
uniformly provide that the outcome of the U.S. creditors'
claims would almost exactly mirror the outcome that would
have resulted in a U.S. bankruptcy proceeding."3 Most courts
do not defer to foreign proceedings when such proceedings
would not treat U.S. creditors the same way that a U.S.
proceeding would treat them. This rule appears to apply even
where such deference would best serve all of the creditors.'
Thus, while "Section 304 is working to promote a universal
approach to insolvency administration,"75 several recent cases
demonstrate that the courts, because of their caution and
distrust of universality, have refused to fully recognize foreign
insolvency proceedings.7" This judicial reluctance indicates
that the United States can never fully adopt a universality
approach if the courts continue to view Section 304(c)(4) as a
threshold test which they should interpret very narrowly.
71 In re Lineas Aeras De Nicaragua, 10 B.R. 790 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981);
In re Banco Nacional De Obras Y Servicios Publicos, 91 B.R. 661 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.1988); In re Axona Int'l Credit & Commerce, 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd 115 B.R. 442 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed,
924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Koreag, Controle et Revision S.A., 961 F.2d
341 (2d Cir. 1992), vacating and remanding 130 B.R. 705 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1991).
" In re Papaleras Reunidas, 92 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988);
Overseas Inns v. U.S., 685 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd 911 F.2d
1146 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Toga Mfg., 28 B.R. 165, (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1983); Interpool Ltd. v. Certain Freights of MV Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1988).
" See infra notes 77-101 and 107-135 and accompanying text.
74 See infra notes 136-177 and accompanying text.
7' Glosband & Katucki, Section 304, supra note 68, at 10.
76 Daniel M. Glosband & Christopher T. Katucki, Current Developments
in International Insolvency Law and Practice, 45 Bus. LAW. 2273, 2274




5.1. Decisions Which Have Unconditionally Deferred to
Foreign Insolvency Proceedings
In re Culmer" numbers among the earliest Section 304
decisions to defer to a foreign insolvency law and proceeding
and to allow the foreign liquidator to obtain possession of the
bankrupt's U.S. assets."' This case involved an international
bank scandal which led to the liquidation of Banco Ambrosiano
Overseas Limited ("BAOL"). The liquidation commenced in
the Bahamas on August 16, 1982. The foreign bankruptcy
court entered a decree which stayed any creditor actions
against the debtor's assets.' At the time of the liquidation,
BAOL had accounts at banks and financial institutions in New
York. On August 9, 1982, a U.S. district court granted
petitioner's request for an attachment of the bankrupt's New
York accounts. On September 8 and 10, 1982, BAOL's
liquidators filed a Section 304 ancillary petition in order to (1)
enjoin all attaching creditors from further proceedings against
BAOL assets; (2) enjoin all others from initiating proceedings
against BAOL assets; (3) enjoin the creation, perfection, and
enforcement of any lien against such assets; and (4) direct all
claimants to BAOL property to return all BAOL deposits (and
other property which they now hold in their hands or which
they may receive) to the Bahamas for administration in
BAOL's liquidation proceedings."0
This case presented the court with the issue of whether to
permit the transfer of BAOL's New York assets to the Baha-
mas so that BAOL's Bahamian liquidators could disperse
them. The court interpreted Section 304's wording and
legislative history to conclude that "the central examination
which it must undertake in order to comply with Section 304(c)
is whether the relief petitioners seek will afford equality of
distribution of the available assets."" Despite this explicit
affirmation of the centrality of equality of distribution of the
available assets, the court stressed that the foreign proceeding
7 25 B.R. 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
7' Glosband & Katucki, Section 304, supra note 68, at 12.
"' Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 6, at 321 (noting the similarity between
this decree and the United States bankruptcy automatic stay).
80 Culmer, 25 B.R. at 623.
s Id at 628.
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would treat those creditors of the bank who objected to this
transfer, and specifically the one lien creditor in the United
States, no differently than if the petitioner had brought the
bankruptcy proceeding in the United States. 2
The court found that the foreign proceeding-which would
deem the lien creditor unsecured in this case-would approxi-
mate a U.S. proceeding for the following reasons. The
avoidance rules of Section 547 of the Code state that a U.S.
trustee may avoid any transfer of the debtor's interest in
property made during the debtor's insolvency" on or within
90 days before the date of filing of the bankruptcy petition."M
In this case, the creditors attached BAOL's New York assets
only seven days before the liquidators filed their original
bankruptcy petition and after the foreign bankruptcy court had
entered a decree similar to the Code's automatic stay.
Consequently, the U.S. court would have avoided the attach-
ment and adjudged the creditors unsecured if the foreign
representatives had originally filed their bankruptcy petitions
in the United States. Thus, a U.S. court also would not have
granted the creditors preferred status in a U.S. bankruptcy
proceeding.8 5 The court argued that "[t]o allow these oppos-
ing creditors to preclude the relief requested would grant them
preferences to which they are not entitled either in a Bahami-
an liquidation.., or in a United States bankruptcy."" The
court also ensured that "relief is also proper under Section
304(c)(4) in that the distribution of BAOL's estate in the
Bahamas will be substantially in accord with the order and
priorities proscribed by Title 11 of the United States Code."'
The court further emphasized its exercise of international
comity in this case and that "[a]nalysis of this principle [of
comity] has traditionally favored its regular application unless
egregiously unjust consequences would flow from its imple-
mentation." 8
The similarity of the probable results from a Bahamian or
82 Id. at 629.
83 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (1988).
84Id. § 547(b)(4)(A).
85 Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 6, at 321, 322.
88 Culmer, 25 B.R. at 629.
8 7 Id. at 631.




a U.S. proceeding undercuts Culmer's precedential value in
terms of adopting universality. Although Culmer proclaims
that the courts should rely on universality in determining
whether to grant Section 304 relief "unless egregiously unjust
consequences would flow from its implementation,""" that
court's decision to submit the bankrupt's assets to a foreign
proceeding would not have even slightly discriminated against
the creditors. As described above, both a Bahamian and a U.S.
proceeding would have treated the creditors as unsecured
creditors and paid them pro rata.90 Because the court did not
have to compromise the U.S. creditor's interests, its expression
of universalistic rhetoric lacks substantial precedential value
and certainly does not signify the United States' total commit-
ment to the distribution of the available assets from a unitary
proceeding.
Cunard S.S. v. Salen Reefer Serv.9" stands as another case
which explicitly endorses universality without compromising
U.S. creditors' interests. In Cunard, the creditors obtained
attachments against the foreign debtor's assets after the
foreign bankruptcy proceedings had begun. The U.S. court
found that "Cunard is not a secured creditor of Salen, but a
general creditor," and that "Cunard initiated this action and
obtained the attachment after Salen had filed its petition for
bankruptcy."" The court found "no compelling policy reason
for a general creditor whose claim is subject to arbitration to
receive a preference over other creditors."" The court de-
clared its certainty that it had adjudged the law of the foreign
bankruptcy proceeding "entirely consistent" with U.S. law. 4
The Cunard court provided very general reasons as to why
U.S. courts should grant Section 304 relief. The court's
arguments manifest its adherence to universality: "[t]he
granting of comity to a foreign bankruptcy proceeding enables
the assets of a debtor to be dispersed in an equitable, orderly,
and systematic manner, rather than in a haphazard, erratic or
8 Id-
90 11 U.S.C. § 726 (1988).
9 773 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1985); 49 B.R. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
92 Cunard, 773 F.2d at 459.
93 Id
94 Id at 460.
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piecemeal fashion."95 These statements evidence the court's
firm belief in the paramountcy of achieving a unitary bank-
ruptcy proceeding. When one examines the case as a whole,
however, it becomes obvious that the court devoted most of its
opinion to explaining that permitting the foreign liquidators to
obtain the U.S. assets would not compromise the local
creditors' rights.8 Thus both the Culmer and Cunard courts
expressly recognized subsection (5) comity as Section 304(c)'s
main "guideline" that the courts apply. In actuality, however,
it appears that the courts mainly focused on subsections (2)-
in order to protect the claim holders in the United States
against prejudice-and (4)-in order to ensure the distribution
of the proceeds "substantially in accordance with the order [the
Code] prescribe[s] .. ."
In In re Lines," a case which scholars commonly cite as
an example of the United States' tendency toward universal-
ism,9" the court emphasized protecting U.S. claimholders.
Lines involved the liquidation of River Plate, a reinsurance
company in Bermuda. To sell reinsurance in New York, River
Plate had established a $1.5 million trust in a New York bank
as security for its customers. Reinsurance Company of
America ("RCA") held a U.S. policy which River Plate had
issued. RCA had satisfied the policy's conditions for payment
of $600,000 from the trust after the winding up proceedings
commenced in Bermuda. The River Plate's joint liquidators
d, at 458.
aThe Cunard court contended that:
The Principles of Swedish bankruptcy law are not dissimilar to
those of our Bankruptcy Code. Swedish law requires that upon
declaration of bankruptcy, an interim trustee or administrator be
appointed and notice sent to all creditors. A meeting of creditors is
scheduled and legal actions by creditors are stayed. In addition,
the court has the power to issue orders preventing the debtor from
dissipating or absconding with assets.
Id. at 459. The court ensured the local creditors further that:
Cunard has not demonstrated that the laws or public policy of the
United States would be violated or in any way infringed by
according comity to the Swedish bankruptcy proceedings... There
is no indication that Cunard will be treated in any manner inimical
to our policy of equality.
Id. at 460, 461.
' 81 B.R. 267 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).




filed a Section 304 petition to preliminarily enjoin RCA from
pursuing the trust's assets. The court, noting comity's
applicability, granted the preliminary injunction: "[clomity
surely requires that the Bermuda Court be given the opportu-
nity to rule on the central issue of RCA's claim." Converse-
ly, in the same breath, the court assured the U.S. claimholders
that "the undisputed evidence is that the Bermuda Court will
interpret the Agreement under New York law, as the Agree-
ment provides, if there is any doubt as to its meaning."
The court also noted that it would distribute the proceeds
accordingly. As in Culmer and Cunard, the Lines court did
not have to worry about the possibility that the distribution of
the proceeds might compromise the U.S. claimholders-
because in this case, the Bermuda court would interpret the
agreement under New York law.101
5.1.1. Decisions Which Did Not Involve the Return ofAssets
Two other decisions, Angulo v. Kedzep 102 and In re
Gee,103 express principles of the universality theory but do
not involve "the essence of Section 304, the return of assets to
a central bankruptcy administration."1 4 - In Angulo, the
trustee of a Canadian liquidation, after unsuccessfully trying
to obtain evidence from the liquidated company's Houston area
former officers and employees, commenced an ancillary Section
304 case in U.S. bankruptcy court for the purpose of discovery.
In determining whether to grant such relief, the court only
looked to one of the Section 304(c) factors-comity. The court
noted that it needed to decide what "will best assure an
economical and expeditious administration of this estate.""'5
"In re Lines, 81 B.R. at 273.
100 Id.
101 Glosband & Katucki, Section 304, supra note 68, (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 541(d)); Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Universal Insurance
Co., 838 F.2d 612 (1st Cir. 1988); 4 William H. Collier, COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY 1 541.13-14 (15th ed. 1985). Commentators have noted that
Lines may compromise well developed United States property law which
states that a bankruptcy estate holds trust property subject to the
outstanding interests of beneficiaries.
102 29 B.R. 417 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1983).
los 53 B.R. 891 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985).
104 Glosband & Katucki, Section 304, supra note 68.
1o5Angulo, 29 B.R. at 419 (quoting 11 U.S.C, § 304(c)).
1992]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
Commentators have consistently pointed to this case as
evidence that U.S. courts rely on a universalist theory which
favors a unitary administration in the foreign proceeding
rather than protection of U.S. creditors' claims.'O Because
this case did not involve the issue of whether to defer to a
foreign proceeding and give U.S. assets to a foreign liquidator,
the courts did not have to risk compromising U.S. creditors in
the interest of the equitable distribution of assets to all
creditors.
In In Re Gee, the liquidator of a foreign liquidation
proceeding in the Cayman Islands filed a Section 304 petition
seeking discovery and the turnover of the defunct Cayman
Islands reinsurance company's books and records. In response,
the company's shareholders petitioned under Chapter 11 of the
Code. The U.S. bankruptcy court granted the liquidator the
relief it had requested and dismissed the Chapter 11 proceed-
ing. The Gee court noted that "[a]lthough comity is only one
of six factors to be considered in determining whether to grant
relief, it often will be the most significant." The court further
found that "exceptions to the doctrine of comity are narrowly
construed."" Despite this affirmation of comity's centrality,
a substantial portion of the decision explained that the laws of
the foreign proceeding would not prejudice or inconvenience
the local shareholders and that the Cayman Islands' laws of
distribution were substantially in accord with those of the
Code.' Thus, while the court proclaimed that it should
treat comity as the most significant factor, it devoted less time
to comity in its decision than it did to demonstrating that the
Cayman Islands' laws would protect the shareholders.
5.2. Decisions Which Have Conditionally Deferred to Foreign
Insolvency Proceedings
Not all courts advocate focusing on the international comity
factor to foster universality. In fact, some courts "have been
more cautious about, and in [several cases] distrustful of,
universality, and have declined to fully recognize the foreign
lo 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 46, 304.04.
107 In re Gee, 53 B.R. at 901.




insolvency proceeding at issue.""' The foregoing statement
describes two groups of cases. In one group of cases, U.S.
courts turned over the local assets to the foreign liquidator,
but only on the condition that the foreign proceeding apply
some aspect of U.S. law or that the U.S. courts apply some
aspect of U.S. law first before turnover. In the second group
of cases, the courts refused to turn over local assets because
they found that in doing so the court would violate public
policy, prejudice local creditors, and violate the Section
304(c)(4) requirement that distribution of proceeds closely
mirror the order that the Code mandates.
The first group consists of four cases which have condi-
tioned Section 304 relief on the foreign proceeding's or U.S.
proceeding's application of some aspects of U.S. law-In re
Lineas Aereas De Nicaragua,." In re Banco Nacional De
Obras Y Servicios Publicos,"' In re Axona Int'l Credit &
Commerce, and In re Koreag."2 In Lineas, a Nicaraguan
debtor's trustee sought turnover of all the debtor's U.S.
property and injunctive relief against U.S. litigation adverse
to the debtor or the debtor's property. The court gave the
trustee possession of the U.S. assets and granted injunctive
relief on three conditions. First, the court required that the
trustee not remove the assets located in the United States.
Second, the court required that the trustee first must use the
local assets to satisfy debts to U.S. creditors. Finally, the
court required that the trustee not encumber, assign, or
abandon any of the debtor's U.S. assets."s
In the second case, In re Banco, agencies of the Mexican
government owned a Mexican company which operated
Aeromexico, Mexico's national airline. Aeromexico conducted
business in Mexico and the United States and employed 350
workers in the United States. The International Association
109 Glosband & Katucki, Current Developments, supra note 76, at 2274.
110 10 B.R. 790 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
... 91 B.R. 661 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988).
112 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd 115 B.R. 442 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991); 130 B.R. 705
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991), 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992), vacating and remand-
ing 130 B.R. 705 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).
"1 In re Lineas, 10 B.R. at 790.; Glosband & Katucki, Section 304, supra
note 68, app. III.
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of Machinists and Aerospace Workers ("IAM") represented
Aeromexico's U.S. workers. Partly as a result of labor
problems in the United States, the Mexican company com-
menced a bankruptcy proceeding under Mexican bankruptcy
law.1 4 The Mexican bankruptcy court allowed the Mexican
company to reject any labor contracts between itself and
various unions including the IAM. The U.S. bankruptcy
court-at the Mexican trustee's request-issued a broad
injunction. The IAM wanted to modify the injunction to
empower the U.S. court to apply U.S. labor law and determine
whether a collective bargaining agreement existed on the date
of the Mexican company's bankruptcy, and, if so, what rights
flowed from it. The court ruled in favor of the IAM because
of the peculiar nature of labor law."5 The peculiar nature
stems from the history of U.S. labor law as "an area in which
traditional contract principles are not strictly applied and in
which policy considerations abound.""' The court felt that
requiring the union members to litigate their claims in Mexico,
and allowing Mexico's courts to apply U.S. labor law, would
"severely prejudice[]" the union members."' The court
further explained that if the U.S. courts found the dispute
minor or found that no collective bargaining agreement
existed, then under notions of comity, the foreign proceeding
would determine where to liquidate the employees's
claims."' The court ruled that the Mexican bankruptcy
court would retain jurisdiction to determine whether to allow
union claims under Mexican bankruptcy law and then to rank
those claims. In essence, "the U.S. bankruptcy court cut the
baby in half by retaining U.S. jurisdiction over the U.S. labor
issue while remitting distribution issues to the Mexican
In re Banco, 91 B.R. at 663 (The Mexican company commenced its
bankruptcy case in Mexico only a few days after the IAM commenced an
action in the Southern District of New York against the company for
declaratory and injunctive relief. IAM commenced the latter suit because
the company notified IAM that the two no longer had a collective bargaining
agreement.).
11 "American labor law is an area which is sui generis." In re Banco, 91
B.R. at 664.
"a Id. at 667, 668.
117 Id. at 667.




bankruptcy proceedings for decision."119
In the third case, In re Axona, the court conditioned Section
304 relief on the application of U.S. law to the distribution of
the proceeds.2 0 This case involved Axona, a bank registered
in Hong Kong. While Axona did not engage in the banking
business in the United States, it did maintain substantial
deposits there. 2 ' In the midst of Axona's collapse, three
banks attached $3.8 million dollars in a U.S. bank account
which Axona controlled." = Through complex self help ma-
neuvers, one of the three banks caused Axona to repay a three
million dollar loan on the day Axona collapsed.123  First,
Axona faced Hong Kong winding-up proceedings."2 Subse-
quently, the Hong Kong liquidators commenced an involuntary
Chapter 7 case against Axona in the United States so that
they could make use of the Code's avoidance powers which
filing an ancillary proceeding under Section 304 would not
provide.'25 After collecting over seven million dollars, both the
U.S. trustee and the Hong Kong liquidators jointly petitioned
the U.S. bankruptcy court to suspend the involuntary Chapter
7 case and direct the turnover of the estate's assets to the
Hong Kong liquidators for distribution in the Hong Kong
winding-up proceeding. 26 The U.S. court granted the relief
and returned the matter and the assets to the foreign proceed-
' Glosband & Katucki, Current Developments, supra note 76, at 2275-
76.
12. In re Axona, 88 B.R. 597 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd 115 B.R. 442
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), appeal dismissed, 924 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1991).
"' Id. at 599.
12 Id.
123 Since 1975, Chemical Bank served as Axona's primary United States
dollar clearing bank. Axona had requested a three million dollar unsecured
time loan from Chemical for one month. Axona had to repay the loan into
the New York account of Chemical's Hong Kong branch. Later that day
Axona learned that it could no longer operate because another deposit
taking company's collapse had resulted in the immediate termination of
Axona's line of credit. Axona did not believe that it could repay the time
loan. As a result, Chemical devised a plan for Axona to immediately repay
the time loan and simultaneously enter into a new fully collateralized
demand loan for Chemical to secure its three million dollar exposure. Id.
at 599, 600.
124 Id. at 600.
125 Id. at 601.
128 Id at 602.
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ing pursuant to specific terms.1 27 The court imposed the
following three terms to protect the U.S. trustee and the U.S.
claimholders:
(1) All administrative expenses as defined in Section
507(a) of the Bankruptcy Code incurred in connection
with this case, as allowed by this Court, shall be paid
by the Trustee out of the assets of this estate.
(2) All other allowed claims filed in this case entitled to
priority under Section 507(b) of the Bankruptcy Code,
if any, shall be paid by the Trustee out of the assets of
this estate.
(3) The Trustee shall retain the sum of $500,000 to
complete the administration of this estate. 2 '
Finally, the In re Koreag, Controle et Revision, S.A. court
allowed turnover of U.S.-based assets to a foreign bankruptcy
proceeding on condition that the U.S. courts first apply local
law to determine whether the foreign bankrupt owned these
assets.29 In that case, the petitioner, the Official Liquidator
of Mebco Bank, S.A. ("Mebco"), a Swiss bank, wanted to
liquidate and distribute Mebco's assets pursuant to Swiss
law.30 Prior to the liquidation, Mebco and Refco F/X Associ-
ates, Inc. ("Refco"), a New York dealer in foreign currencies,
had established an arrangement under which Mebco delivered
funds to Refco. More specifically, that arrangement required
Refco to deliver foreign currency and U.S. dollars to Mebco's
account at a bank in Europe in exchange for Mebco's simulta-
neous delivery of U.S. dollars and foreign currency of compara-
ble value to Mebco's account at Swiss Bank Corporation in
New York ("Swiss Bank-New York") with instructions to the
bank to credit Refco's account at Citibank in New York.'
The Swiss Banking Commission of Switzerland decided to
liquidate Mebco and as a result, Swiss Bank-New York decided
to stop all payments out of Mebco's account, including those
which were intended as performance for Refco's currency
127 Id. at 618.
128 Id.
129 961 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1992), vacating and remanding 130 B.R. 705
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991).





exchange. After Refco learned of this information, it sued
Mebco in the Southern District of New York to obtain an ex
parte order of attachment of Mebco's account at Swiss Bank-
New York. Refco argued it had a right to attach Mebco's
account because Refco transferred approximately 6.9 million
dollars and 4.1 million dollars of foreign currency (the "Disput-
ed Funds") into Mebco's European bank account, but Mebco did
not make reciprocating transfers from Mebco's account at
Swiss Bank-New York to Refco's account at Chemical Bank in
New York. In addition, Refco motioned to confirm the
attachment. In response, the petitioner filed a Section 304
petition and sought to enjoin Refco from reaching the Disputed
Funds and to turn over the Disputed Funds to petitioner for
administration in the Swiss proceedings.13
In response to petitioner's section 304 petition, Refco
argued that the bankruptcy court must determine whether the
Disputed Funds were the debtor's property before the court
could turnover these funds pursuant to section 304. In order
to determine jurisdiction under section 304, the bankruptcy
court stated it only needed to look at whether "(1) a foreign
proceeding was commenced against the debtor; (2) the petition-
er is a foreign representative entitled to file the action under
section 304; and (3) 'the debtor had certain assets within the
judicial district where the petition was filed.' ""' The peti-
tioner clearly met the first two requirements. The bankruptcy
court applied Swiss law to determine whether Mebco had
assets in the district in the United States where the petition
was filed and found that Mebco satisfied the third require-
ment.3
The heart of the case, however, concerned the creditor's
different rights under U.S. and Swiss law-New York law
would deem Refco a secured creditor, while Swiss law would
consider Refco unsecured. Nonetheless, the bankruptcy court
placed great weight on comity in applying Section 304(c):
[this court] need not address the merits of Refco's claim
that under the Code and New York laws it holds a
1
3 Id. at 709.
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secured claim because that is not the test under Section
304. The test is whether the proceedings in Switzer-
land comport with fundamental notions of fairness not
that the foreign bankruptcy laws are a mirror image of
our own.
1 3 5
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to petitioner
and thus turnover of the Disputed Funds."' Thus, the
bankruptcy court departed from the majority of Section 304
cases because it upheld universality despite the fact that in
doing so it risked compromising the interests of a U.S.
creditor.
The bankruptcy court's order, however, did not survive the
court of appeal's scrutiny. The district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court order but stayed enforcement of the order in
order to permit Refco to apply to the court of appeals. Refco
appealed and the district court granted a further stay requir-
ing Swiss Bank-New York to hold the Disputed Funds pending
final determination of Refco's appeal.13 Refco appealed on
two grounds. First, Refco argued that, according to section
304(b)(2), the Disputed Funds were not property of Mebco's
estate. Therefore, Refco stated that the bankruptcy and
district courts should not have ordered turnover of these funds.
Second, Refco argued that even if the Disputed Funds were
Mebco's estate's property, the bankruptcy and district courts
incorrectly applied section 304(c)'s six factors and for that
reason alone the courts should not have ordered turnover of
the property. 3s
The court of appeals found that New York law not Swiss
law governed the determination of who owned the Disputed
Funds.3 9 The court of appeals found that "[d]espite connec-
tions to both jurisdictions we conclude that New York has a
superior interest,"14 with respect to determining who owns
the Disputed Funds and that "New York's primary interest is
'5 Id. at 713, 714 (citation omitted).
'38 Id, at 716.
" In re Koreag, Controle et Revision, S.A., 961 F.2d at 348 (2d Cir.
1992).138 Id
139 Id.




in defining and protecting the property interests of its citizens
and those who do business there."141 Thus, the court of
appeals vacated the district court's order. In applying New
York law, the court of appeals found that Refco owned 6.9
million dollars of the Disputed Funds and that the district
court should not turnover this amount to the petitioner."
The court of appeals remanded the case, however, to determine
under New York. law who owned the Disputed Funds's
remaining 4.1 million dollars.1 "
Because the court of appeals remanded the case to deter-
mine who owned the remaining amount of the Disputed Funds,
it stated that it was not necessary to address whether turnover
of these funds was improper because the bankruptcy and
district courts only addressed comity to the exclusion of the
other section 304(c) factors. The court, however, did note that
"neither the Code nor the legislative history accords superior
weight to the comity factor."
1"
Although the court of appeals did not address whether the
bankruptcy and district court's improperly emphasized comity
over the other factors of section 304(c), it did stress that
comity is not the decisive factor that a court should consider.
In addition, by vacating the bankruptcy and district court's
order and holding that New York law would apply in the
determination of the ownership of the Disputed Funds, the
court of appeals indirectly placed a condition on U.S. deference
to the Swiss proceeding. The indirect condition protected the
U.S. creditor, Refco, by determining that Refco owned at least
6.9 million dollars of the Disputed Funds and exposed the
court of appeal's territorial nature. Thus in this case, al-
though the universality doctrine won the battle in the bank-
ruptcy court, the territoriality doctrine won the war by the
indirect condition the court of appeals placed on the turnover.
In imposing conditions on the transfer of U.S. assets, these
four cases reveal that U.S. courts invariably focus on and
privilege the interests of the U.S. creditors. The first three
decisions also expose the courts' belief that to fully protect the
141 1& (emphasis added).
142 Id. at 356.
143 Id at 358.
144 Id
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U.S. creditors, the courts must ensure that foreign proceedings
will not treat U.S. creditors differently in any important ways
than the Code would treat them.1 Thus, these decisions
contradict the legislative intent behind Section 304.1"
5.3. Decisions Which Have Not Deferred to Foreign Bankruptcy
Proceedings
Not all of the Section 304 cases have ruled in favor of the
foreign representative. In fact, in several cases the U.S. courts
have found that a transfer of the assets would violate the
interests of the U.S. claimholders. These cases demonstrate
the persistence of the U.S. judicial endorsement of
territoriality.
Concern over the foreign liquidators' questionable conduct
in In re Papaleras Reunidas47 influenced the court's decision
not to grant Section 304 relief. Thus the court prevented
Spanish liquidators from obtaining possession of U.S. assets to
distribute according to a Spanish liquidation proceeding. In
that case, Adams served as a U.S. distributor of cigarette
rolling paper, which a Spanish manufacturer, Papeleras,
produced. Adams had obtained ajudgment in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois against Papeleras for
more than $1.4 million on a breach of contract claim.
1 48
After the Spanish liquidation proceeding commenced, Adams
moved to attach the Papeleras' trademarks registered in the
United States.149 The Spanish liquidators opposed this motion
and, in doing so, represented to the court that they had not
planned to sell the trademarks. 50 The district court granted
Adam's motion but stated that it would set aside the lien if the
liquidators could provide the court with certain Spanish law
provisions. The court asked the liquidators to furnish provi-
sions which rendered the lien on the trademarks improper and
which established that the Spanish proceeding would recognize
14 Hughes, supra note 4, at 32.
146 See infra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
'47 92 B.R. 584 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).
4 M at 585, 586.





Adams as a creditor." 1 The liquidators failed to present the
Spanish law to the court. Consequently, the lien continued.
Despite their representations to the contrary, that same month
the liquidators sold the trademarks to Bambu in Madrid. In
fact, the court later learned that the liquidators and Bambu
had negotiated for the transfer before the liquidators opposed
Adams' motion. 52 Adams, reacting to this transfer, filed
suit in the district court alleging that Papeleras' liquidators
had fraudulently conveyed the trademarks. 5 Two months
later, the Spanish liquidators brought a Section 304 ancillary
proceeding to prevent Adams from seizing and garnishing the
balance of the payments due Papeleras from Bambu for the
trademarks.'
The court denied relief because the liquidators had not
given Adams' notice of the Spanish proceeding and Spanish
law does not classify judgment lien creditors as secured
creditors 5 but instead defines them as general unsecured
creditors. The court noted that "the laws of both countries
with respect to the distribution of funds in an insolvency
proceeding are also markedly different." 5 ' Thus granting
the liquidators' request for relief would have violated Section
304(c)(4)-distributing funds substantially in accordance with
the Code's scheme. The court also voiced concern regarding
the liquidators' conduct in transferring the trademarks to
Bambu.
The Papeleras court disagreed with the Gee and Culmer
courts regarding comity's paramountcy over the other five
Section 304(c) factors when deciding whether to grant Section
304 relief. Instead the court contended that:
[T]he legislative history reflects that when Representa-
tive Don Edwards introduced the final bill to the House,
he stated: "Section 304(c) is modified to indicate that





164 I at 589.
15 U.S. law, however, would classify Adams as a judgment lien creditor,
a classification which would entitle Adams to priority over unsecured
creditors. See U.C.C. § 9-301(b) (West 1991).
15" In re Papeleras Reunidas, S.A., 92 B.R. at 593.
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addition to the other factors specified therein."
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598.
Thus, it is best to equally consider all of the variables
of § 304(c) in determining the appropriate relief in an
ancillary proceeding."'
The court explained that if only one factor, "the economical
and expeditious administration of [the] estate" existed, the
court might have given the local assets to the Spanish
liquidators. After reasoning that it had to consider Section
304(c)'s other five factors which "overwhelmingly dictate[d]"
that the court deny the relief, the court did not allow the
Spanish liquidators to receive the proceeds. Therefore, the
court resolved the conflict inherent in Section 304(c) in favor
of a territorial approach based.on the facts of this case.15
Courts can employ comity to oppose rather than favor
deference to the foreign judicial proceeding. Overseas Inns159
exemplifies this use of comity. There the court stressed that
"[it is a settled principle of comity that deference need not be
given to foreign judgments in the face of significant counter-
vailing public policy reasons."1" The case involved a Luxem-
bourg corporation, Overseas, who at the time of their bank-
ruptcy in Luxembourg, owed the Internal Revenue Service
("IRS") approximately one million dollars. According to the
debtor's reorganization plan in Luxembourg, Overseas planned
to pay only $231,475 or 23.49% of its income tax deficiency.
After receiving a copy of the plan, the IRS did not object.
When the IRS only received $179,135.76, it levied on payments
that third parties in the United States owed to Overseas. This
enabled the IRS to collect an additional $919,835.79. Overseas
57 Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
M58 kL at 595; contra Glosband & Katucki, Current Developments, supra
note 76, at 2276.
Viewed in a vacuum, an injunction appears to be a wholly appropri-
ate means of assisting the liquidators' effort to collect all assets of
the estate for administration in a single proceeding governed by
Spanish insolvency law. However, on the facts presented in this
case, the court's refusal to grant the relief has basis in universal
principles of equity rather than territorial justice.
159 685 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1988), aff'd, 911 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir.




moved for summary judgment claiming that the court should
accord comity to the Luxembourg court's judgment which
found that Overseas had fully satisfied its obligations to the
IRS.1
61
The Overseas court ruled in favor of the IRS after closely
analyzing the universality and territoriality theories... and
deciding that "[ilt need not adopt one approach over the
other."" In a footnote, however, the court revealed that
notions of territoriality must take precedence over notions of
universality in certain situations:
Overseas also argues that this court should accord
comity because doing so would promote efficient
resolution of international bankruptcies. While this is
a relevant factor in determining whether to recognize a
foreign judgment, public policy considerations will
receive greater weight when the foreign decree violates
domestic public policy.'
This footnote suggests that the court believed that whenever
a foreign judicial proceeding might impinge on some notion of
domestic public policy, it would retreat to territoriality. In
this case, the court found domestic public policy considerations
to counsel against according comity to the foreign proceedings.
The court made this determination because foreign proceedings
would not give priority to the federal taxes and would treat the
foreign company's payment of only a percentage of the taxes it
owed as satisfaction of the entire tax obligation.
Another case in which the court refused to defer to a
foreign proceeding, In re Toga Mfg., a may go down in
international insolvency history as the most infamous U.S.
decision. This case received more criticism than Overseas and
Papeleras primarily because it involved a foreign proceeding in
a "sister common law jurisdiction," Canada. 6' Traditionally,
U.S. courts have held that "[t]hese exceptions [to the rule of
comity] are construed especially narrowly when the alien
181 Id, at 968-70.
162 Id. at 971, 972.
163 Id. at 972.
164 Id. at 973 n.14.
165 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
166 Glosband & Katucki, Current Developments, supra note 76, at 2278.
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jurisdiction is, like Canada, a sister common law jurisdiction
with procedures akin to our own.
"16
Toga involved Hesse, a Michigan corporation, which had
contracted with Toga, a Canadian corporation, to serve as
Toga's exclusive sales representative. Hesse became a
judgment creditor of Toga and as a result garnished money
that certain creditors owed Toga. A Michigan circuit court
clerk held the garnished funds in an account pending resolu-
tion of a security interest priority dispute between Hesse and
Toga's largest secured creditor, a Canadian bank. Michigan
law considered Hesse a lien creditor. Six nlonths later,
another creditor of Toga commenced an involuntary proceeding
in bankruptcy under Canadian law. Toga's Canadian trustee
brought an ancillary proceeding pursuant to Section 304
seeking to enjoin all of Toga's creditors from taking any action
against Toga's U.S. assets. The trustee also sought an order
directing the Michigan court's clerk to turn the funds over to
the Canadian trustee. 6'
The Toga court denied relief to the Canadian trustee
because it believed such relief would violate Section 304(c)(4)
because the distribution of proceeds would not substantially
comport with the Code. The court did not ignore the "close
geographic proximity of Canada and the United States."'
The court did, however, emphasize that U.S. law would
recognize Hesse as a lien creditor while Canadian law would
consider Hesse an ordinary creditor with no priority in the
distribution of proceeds.7 The court used Section 304(c)(4)
as a threshold test. Once the court had determined that the
use of Canadian law in this case would fail the Section
304(c)(4) test, it would not accord comity greater weight in its
decision.
Commentators have called the court's "use of chauvinistic
language" the most shocking aspect of the Toga decision.""
The first sentence of the discussion stated that, "[historically,
the bankruptcy laws of our country have been hostile towards
C larkson v. Shaheen, 544 F.2d 624, 629-30 (2d Cir. 1976); see supra
notes 32-45 and accompanying text.
"SIn re Toga Mfg., 28 B.R. 165, 165-167 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983).
1701 I .




claims asserted by foreign trustees in bankruptcy against
alleged estate property located in the United States."7" The
court quickly pointed out that the definition of comity does not
automatically obligate the courts to grant relief to a foreign
proceeding and does require the court to have "due regard...
for the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are
under protection of its laws."173  The court hinted that
"[pirinciples of international comity and respect for the
judgments and laws of other nations.., could be promoted by
a treaty between the United States and Canada ..." In
the absence of such a treaty, the court felt obligated to grant
Section 304 relief and argued that other Section 304(c) factors
besides comity favor denying such relief.
While some have criticized Toga as an "emasculation" of
Section 304,' that case did not violate subsection (c).
Instead, the court decided to take advantage of the flexibility
Congress had offered to it and to give greater weight to
subsection (c)(4) than the other factors. One must remember
that "[c]omity is only one of the six criteria listed in Section
304(c) to guide the court in determining whether to grant the
requested relief; to promote principles of comity above the
remaining five criteria would be to ignore the literal terms of
the statute."76 While the Toga court might not have fur-
thered universality in international insolvencies, it did not
overstep its Section 304 powers when it decided to protect local
creditors rather than to foster international comity princi-
ples.7  As one article which provides a Canadian perspec-
tive on Section 304's application noted, "[n]onetheless, the
flexibility provided to American courts by section 304, while
domestically beneficial, generates too much uncertainty for
section 304 to serve as the international model." 7 8
The most recent decision to refuse to recognize a foreign
12 Toga, 28 B.R. at 167.
173 Idc. at 169 (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895)).
174 Id. at 169 (citation omitted).
.. Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 6, at 321 (citing Brian J. Gallagher &
John Hartje, The Effectiveness of§ 304 in Achieving Efficient and Economic
Equity in Tansnational Insolvency, 1983 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 1, 21).
176 Gitlin & Flaschen, supra note 6, at 321.
177 Id
178 Leonard, Carfagnini & McLaren, supra note 1, at 32.
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bankruptcy proceeding, Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights of
MIV Venture Star,' has rekindled international concerns
about the United States' willingness to recognize foreign
insolvency proceedings. In Interpool, a creditor, Wah Kwong,
had filed involuntary liquidation proceedings in Australia
against the debtor KKL, an Australian liner company which
operated liner service between the United States and Austra-
lia. Wah Kwong had business dealings with KKL and also sat
on its board of directors. KKL also had U.S. creditors and held
assets in the United States which included rights to an
arbitration proceeding. KKL's Australian court-appointed
liquidator filed a section 304 ancillary proceeding to gain
possession of KKL's U.S. assets. Subsequently, the U.S.
creditors filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition under
Chapter 7 of the Code for the regular liquidation of the U.S.
assets. Thereafter, KKL's liquidator entered into a settlement
where he would distribute to a Wah Kwong subsidiary the first
six million dollars that KKL received in any U.S. arbitration
award. The liquidator would leave the remaining proceeds to
satisfy KKL's other creditors. Even though the parties did not
give prior notice of this agreement between the liquidator and
Wah Kwong to any other creditors, the Australian court
sanctioned the agreement." °
The court refused to dismiss the Chapter 7 case and
declined to defer to the liquidator's section 304 petition. As a
result, the court ordered that U.S. law would control the
administration of the U.S. assets. The court gave two reasons
for denying Section 304 relief. First, because the U.S.
creditors had no prior notice of the settlement agreement
between KKL and Wah Kwong, they could not participate in
17 102 B.R. 373 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988); Glosband & Katucki, Current
Developments, supra note 76, at 2277; Westbrook, supra note 11, at app. III
A; see also, Hughes, supra note 4 (providing an Australian Perspective on
Interpool).
10 Interpool, 102 B.R. at 374-76 (Australian law does not require notice);
see Hughes, supra note 4, at 32 ("In this commentator's experience, it would
have been unprecedented for the Supreme Court of New South Wales to not
have positively considered the interests of the United States creditors before





the agreement.' Second, Australian law had no analogue
to the substantive remedy of equitable subordination appear-
ing in Section 510(c) of the Code."8 2 The court argued that
it must consider this difference because of KKL's and Wah
Kwong's possible insider manipulations: "[o]n its face there
appear to be substantial allegations of insider machinations
which would require that a court consider equitable subordina-
tion.""a  The Interpool court noted that "[t]here is no re-
quirement that Australian law and United States law be
identical. ""' Nevertheless, the court found that "the proce-
dural protections available to creditors in the United States
were not given to the United States creditors in Austra-
lia," "'8 and that "the substantive remedy of equitable subor-
dination is available in the United States. It is not, however,
available under Australian law." 8' In forceful language the
court argued.that "this Court does not intend to sit idly by
while United States citizens and creditors are harmed."
17
This language, replete with territorialism, portends trouble:
Interpool, however, may have a more far reaching
effect than Toga Manufacturing or Overseas Inns,
because it questions, in general terms, the notice
procedures of Australian insolvency law, thereby
suggesting that Australian proceedings should rarely be
recognized by U.S. bankruptcy courts. Such a view
appears contrary to the spirit of section 304 and the
principle of comity, and runs counter to many other
U.S. decisions recognizing the proceedings of a variety
of foreign jurisdictions.'
181 Interpool, 102 B.R. at 378, 379. Australia has no law equivalent to
Rule 2002(a)(5) of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure which requires that
"creditors be notified prior to the institutionalization of agreements between
the trustee and any of the creditors." Id. at 378; see also Hughes, supra note
4, at 32.
182 Interpool, 102 B.R. at 379; Glosband & Katucki, Current Develop-
ments, supra note 76, at 2278.
'"Id. at 380.
18 Id. at 378.
1 5Id. at 379.
1 Id,
1
7 Id. at 380.
188 Glosband & Katucki, Current Developments, supra note 76, at 2278.
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6. CONCLUSION
As Congress has drafted it, Section 304 aspires to become
a model for international bankruptcy law. As most courts
have applied it, however, it serves as a reminder of the
prevailing spirit of U.S. protectionism. Examination of the
case law regarding Section 304's applications reveals that, in
most cases, when a foreign representative forces the U.S. court
to choose between fostering international comity and protect-
ing local creditors, the court will not compromise local
creditors interests even if such a compromise will "best assure
an economical and expeditious administration of such estate"
for all creditors worldwide. The Culmer, Cunard, and Gee
decisions support the United States' commitment to the
principle of international comity. Lineas, Banco, Axona, and
Koreag which conditionally defer to foreign insolvency proceed-
ings, and Papeleras, Overseas, Toga, and Interpool, which
reject deference to the foreign proceedings even after consider-
ing notions of international comity, undermine that support.
Cooperation implies compromise. If the United States truly
wishes to encourage other nations to cooperate in international
bankruptcy proceedings and sincerely seeks to implement the
legislative intent behind Section 304, it must enjoin its courts
to consistently adopt a universalistic approach. Such an
approach must prevail even if it will compromise U.S.
creditors' interests. Until U.S. courts demonstrate their
concerted commitment to universality, the United States will
find itself hiding behind a "drapery of illusion' that has
become completely transparent to the rest of the world.
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